Russian elites are now discussing a future beyond Putin

By Ahmet Taş | Wise News Press
MOSCOW, RUSSIA — Russian political and business elites are increasingly beginning to speak about the war in Ukraine as President Vladimir Putin’s personal project rather than a shared national cause, raising new questions about Moscow’s long-term political direction.

An analysis cited in Berfu Kargı’s report argues that Putin still controls the state through repression, fear and the security apparatus, but is gradually losing one of his most important political strengths: the ability to define Russia’s future. The shift does not mean an immediate collapse of the system, but it suggests that the foundations of Putin’s authority are being discussed in a new way among Russia’s ruling circles.

Language among elites is changing

One of the most striking observations in the analysis is the change in language used by senior officials, regional governors and business figures.

In the earlier stages of the war, Kremlin-linked circles frequently used collective expressions such as “our war,” “our decision” and “our agenda.” Today, according to the analysis, the same circles increasingly describe the conflict as Putin’s war or Putin’s personal story.

This does not amount to open rebellion. Russia’s political system remains highly centralized, and dissent within elite circles is dangerous. However, the language shift indicates that the war is losing its status as a collective project. For the first time in years, the possibility of a Russia beyond Putin is being discussed more openly in private and semi-public circles.

The cost of war has spread across society

The first major factor weakening the old political balance is the rising cost of the war in Ukraine.

At the beginning, the conflict was presented to Russian society as a limited “special military operation” that could be conducted without disrupting daily life for most citizens. That model has gradually broken down.

The war now affects a much wider part of society. Inflation, higher taxes, neglected infrastructure, censorship, travel restrictions and political repression have all entered everyday life. The cost is no longer limited to soldiers and families directly connected to the front line.

The analysis argues that the Kremlin has not offered society a convincing vision in exchange for these sacrifices. Citizens are asked to accept pressure and hardship, but the state no longer provides a clear promise of prosperity, stability or future national renewal.

Russian elites want rules and guarantees

A second major source of tension is the question of property and legal protection.

Before the war and Western sanctions, many Russian elites protected their wealth through foreign legal systems, offshore structures, London courts and international arbitration mechanisms. These systems offered a degree of predictability that Russia’s domestic institutions did not provide.

After sanctions and geopolitical isolation, many wealthy Russians were forced to bring capital and disputes back into Russia. But the Russian system lacks independent courts and reliable institutional protections. This has left elites more exposed to arbitrary decisions, asset transfers and pressure from state-linked groups.

The analysis notes that in recent years, large volumes of assets have reportedly been taken from private owners and transferred either to the state or to figures close to the regime. This has created anxiety among business circles that once benefited from Putin’s system but now fear becoming its targets.

Putin’s foreign policy framework is also shifting

The third pressure point is geopolitical.

Putin has long presented Russia as a power capable of reshaping the global order. The war in Ukraine was framed as part of that larger confrontation with the West. Yet the analysis argues that Russia has become less a designer of a new order and more an accelerator of global instability.

The war has deepened divisions in Western democracies, strengthened populist narratives and increased fatigue with globalization. But at the same time, Russia has lost several advantages it once held.

Europe is no longer as dependent on Russian gas. The influence of the United Nations Security Council has weakened, reducing the value of Russia’s permanent seat. Nuclear threats, once used to project strategic power, have also damaged Moscow’s claim to be a responsible balancing force.

As the rules-based order weakens, the advantages Putin expected from his revisionist strategy are also becoming less certain.

Russia faces an identity crisis

Another major theme in the analysis is Russia’s identity crisis.

Historically, Russia often defined itself through its relationship with Europe and the West. At times it tried to catch up with the West; at other times it positioned itself against it. This relationship provided Russia with a reference point, even when the relationship was hostile.

Now, as the West itself faces internal political and cultural crises, Russia’s old frame of comparison has become weaker. The country is being forced to produce a sense of direction from within.

The analysis argues that the current leadership has failed to provide that meaning. The Kremlin can still demand loyalty, but it struggles to explain what future that loyalty is supposed to serve.

Repression remains, but the promise has disappeared

Putin’s earlier social contract was relatively simple: the state would not interfere too deeply in private life, and citizens would stay away from politics. In return, the system offered consumption, services and a certain level of comfort.

That balance has now changed.

The state demands more ideological conformity, more censorship, more restrictions and more loyalty. But it no longer offers the same level of material comfort or confidence in the future. Repression has become harsher, but also less purposeful.

The analysis describes this as one of the deeper weaknesses of the system: people are being asked to remain loyal, but the destination of that loyalty is unclear. Fear can preserve power in the short term, but it cannot easily generate legitimacy for the future.

Putin is compared to a player in zugzwang

The analysis uses the chess term “zugzwang” to describe Putin’s current position. In chess, zugzwang refers to a situation in which every possible move makes the player’s position worse.

Applied to Russian politics, the comparison suggests that Putin may remain in power for now, but every step taken to preserve the system also accelerates its decay.

More repression may silence criticism temporarily. A new military escalation may mobilize patriotic rhetoric. Stronger ideological control may enforce obedience. But none of these moves can repair the growing gap between the Kremlin’s power and Russia’s future.

The system can continue functioning, but its ability to inspire confidence is weakening.

A post-Putin future enters the conversation

The most striking conclusion is that Russians within elite circles are increasingly thinking about what comes after Putin.

This does not mean a transition is imminent. The security services remain powerful, the opposition is heavily repressed and institutions are controlled by the Kremlin. The system still has the tools to survive.

However, Putin’s authority has long depended not only on control, but also on the belief that he represents Russia’s future. If that belief erodes, the political system becomes more fragile, even if it still appears strong on the surface.

The war was launched in part to preserve and strengthen Putin’s system. Yet the analysis suggests that the same war has now made the future of that system more uncertain.

For Russia’s elites, the question is no longer only what Putin will decide next. Increasingly, the question is what Russia will look like when Putin is no longer the central figure of its political life.

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